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This paper examines the link between rank-and-file employees’ unemployment concerns and 
financial reporting opacity. Following Agrawal and Matsa (JFE, 2013), we use exogenous 
variations in state unemployment insurance benefits to capture changes to unemployment 
concerns. We find that when unemployment concerns are lower, there is less opaque financial 
reporting. This relation is stronger when workers face higher unemployment risk, labor union 
participation is high, and executives have higher equity incentives. Using Tobin’s Q to capture 
firm value, we also find that the economic rationale to engage in opaque financial reporting 
reduces when unemployment benefits are high. Our findings suggest that labor market policies 
have a significant, likely unintended, positive externality on corporate reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine how unemployment concerns of rank and file workers affect 
financial reporting opacity.1 Unemployment imposes significant economic, physiological, and 
psychological costs on workers (e.g., Diamond, 1982; Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Lazear, 
2003; Mortensen, 1986; Wanberg, 2012). Workers are likely to be less concerned about 
unemployment if they are provided with reliefs such as unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, 
in the event that they are laid off. Prior theories and empirical evidence that link labor conditions 
to financial reporting choices typically focus on how employment considerations of senior 
executives (e.g., bonus contracts and equity incentives) affect these choices (e.g., Healy, 1985; 
Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Goldman and Slezak, 2006). In contrast, there is very little evidence on how unemployment 
concerns of broader groups of rank and file employees impact these reporting choices. Filling 
this gap can lead to a more holistic understanding of how labor conditions, and in particular labor 
frictions such as unemployment, affect financial reporting outcomes. 
Financial reporting opacity is an outcome of managers’ discretionary behavior with 
respect to firms’ financial reporting decisions. While prior research has suggested opacity to be 
associated with outcomes such as higher stock price crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009) and cost of 
capital (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 2004, 2005), even shareholder value maximizing 
managers may engage in such behavior because they find it the best option in equilibrium (e.g., 
Shivakumar, 2000).  
We expect unemployment concerns of rank and file employees to result in more opaque 
financial reports because managers have incentives to engage in discretionary reporting to 
project the firm as a “safe” employer and reduce associated costs. It is well established in the 
                                                            
1 For parsimony, henceforth, we will use the term “opacity” to refer to financial reporting opacity. 
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labor economics literature that unemployment risk is costly to firms because employees 
concerned about the adverse effects of unemployment require firms to provide a wage premium 
(“compensating wage differential”) for this risk exposure. The outcome is an increase in the 
firm’s compensation expenses (Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981; Li, 1986). This compensating 
wage differential is not trivial. For example, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) conservatively estimate 
that when there are no UI benefits, the cost of compensating wage differentials is over 150 basis 
points of firm value for a BBB-rated firm. Therefore managers have incentives to engage in 
discretionary reporting activities so that their firms appear less risky to their current as well as 
prospective employees, which, in turn, reduces compensating wage differentials and other related 
costs (Dou et al., 2014). We expect this behavior to result in more opaque financial reports.2 
Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we use exogenous inter-state cross-sectional and 
intra-state time-series variations in United States UI benefits to identify changes in 
unemployment concerns (that is, more generous the benefits, lower the concerns) to investigate 
whether firms’ opacity is affected by these concerns.  Similar to Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we 
argue that this approach enables us to identify the impact of shocks to concerns about 
unemployment on corporate financial reports because legally mandated increases in UI payments 
by states reduce the costs workers face when unemployed.3 To measure financial reporting 
opacity, we rely on Hutton et al.’s (2009) opacity measure (computed as the sum of absolute 
annual abnormal accruals).  
Using data on state-level UI benefits from 1991 to 2012, we find evidence that greater 
unemployment concerns (as indicated by lower UI benefits) increase opacity. Following Agrawal 
                                                            
2 It is also possible that unemployment concerns create incentives for rank and file employees to engage in 
misreporting activities at the local level, which, in turn results in more opaque consolidated financial statements 
because these statements use information aggregated at local levels. However, an empirical investigation of this 
possibility is difficult.  
3 Agrawal and Matsa (2013) show that increases in state UI benefits are associated with greater state UI payouts. 
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and Matsa (2013), when we exclude firms that likely have a more geographically dispersed 
workforce, the results become even stronger.  For firms with a more geographically dispersed 
workforce, we are more likely to measure eligible state UI benefits with some error because we 
assign these benefits to the state where the firm is headquartered, whereas the UI benefits are 
typically assessed at the state in which the employee performs her work.  
To further our understanding of the effects of unemployment concerns on opacity, we run 
several cross-sectional analyses. The first set of analyses is based on the idea that expected 
unemployment income is a function of both unemployment risk and UI benefits. In particular, 
workers have higher unemployment concerns when unemployment risk is high and UI benefits 
are low. Capturing unemployment risk in terms of firms’ bankruptcy risk, operating cash flow 
levels, and difficulty of being reemployed in the event of an involuntary layoff we show that 
lower UI benefits increase opacity even more when employees likely face higher unemployment 
risk.  
Second, we examine how the relation between UI and opacity is affected by the labor 
union participation rates. Both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that unemployment 
concerns are especially costly for unionized firms due to union influence in imposing higher 
compensating wage differentials (Moore, 1995; Viscusi, 1980). If so, the benefits of generous UI 
programs should be greater for firms operating in highly unionized environments. Consistent 
with this prediction, we find a stronger relation between UI benefits and opacity for firms 
domiciled in states with high labor union power. Third, we find the effect of unemployment 
concerns on opacity to be greater for the subsample of firms whose top executives have high 
equity incentives. As noted earlier, workers will demand a higher wage premium when they are 
concerned about unemployment and unemployment benefits are low. This wage premium leads 
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to higher employment costs that reduce the value of the firm. Hence, to maximize the value of 
their equity, top executives have greater incentives to be opaque in their financial reporting and 
reduce the wage premium.  
In additional analyses, we show that the negative relation between UI benefits and 
opacity remains significant after controlling for future UI benefits. In contrast, there is no 
significant relation between future UI and opacity. These results mitigate concerns about reverse 
causality. We also consider potential nonlinearity between UI benefits and opacity. In particular, 
we conjecture that UI is likely to have a more salient effect on financial reporting decisions when 
there has been a recent increase in UI because of the attention that these increases attract. Our 
findings support this conjecture as we observe the effect of UI on reducing opacity to be higher 
when there is a recent increase in the insurance. We also show that the results are robust to the 
use of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accruals quality measure (computed as the standard 
deviation of annual abnormal accruals) and a modified opacity measure that links measurement 
window of opacity to the occurrence of UI benefit changes.4  
Our analyses are based on the premise that opacity due to unemployment fears is driven 
by managers’ attempts to minimize firm value reducing compensating wage differential costs. 
Therefore, as generous UI benefits alleviate workers’ unemployment concerns, the rationale to 
engage in opaque reporting diminishes. In our final analysis we directly investigate this 
conjecture by examining whether and how UI benefits impact the relation between firm value 
and opacity. We capture firm value in terms of Tobin’s Q. As conjectured throughout the paper, 
we the find role of opacity in maximizing firm value to diminish when UI benefits are high. This 
                                                            
4 The accruals quality measure is similar in spirit to Hutton’s et al. (2009) opacity measure in that both rely on the 
patterns of abnormal accruals over time to determine the quality of financial reporting. A key difference, however, is 
that the accruals quality measure has greater data requirements (i.e., results in a lower sample size) because of the 
model that is used to compute abnormal accruals. It has been shown to be associated with lower market and liquidity 
risk as well as cost of capital (e.g., Francis et al. 2004, 2005; Ng, 2011). 
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result provides direct evidence for the ex-ante economic rationale for opaque financial reporting 
in the presence of unemployment concerns. 
Our paper supports and extends the findings of Dou, Khan and Zou (2015). Using a 
similar setting, Dou et al. (2015) find that unemployment concerns induce firms to engage in 
long-run upward earnings management. Instead of focusing on the direction of earnings 
management, we hypothesize and provide evidence to indicate that discretionary reporting 
behavior induced by unemployment concerns results in more opaque financial statements.5 Our 
cross sectional tests provide additional insights on conditions under which the conjectured 
behavior is exacerbated/moderated. Moreover, we show that, despite potential costs of opacity 
(e.g., Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 2004, 2005; Hutton et al., 2009), the observed behavior is 
consistent with managers’ attempts to minimize costs associated with workers’ unemployment 
risk. In other words, we provide evidence that there is economic rationale to being opaque when 
unemployment concerns are higher in that such as action can enhance firm value. This highlights 
the fact that full transparency might not always be the best firm policy. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in two key ways. First, even though the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recognizes employees as a primary group of financial 
statement users, few studies investigate whether financial reporting choices are influenced by 
broad labor considerations (e.g., Hamm, Jung, and Lee, 2013; Dou et al, 2015).6 In contrast, a 
large body of literature documents how the remuneration of top executives (typically, CEOs and 
CFOs) influences firms’ financial reporting quality (e.g., see, Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Kothari, 
2001). Second, the extant literature on how corporate behavior is affected by UI investigates 
issues ranging from wage-setting (e.g., see, Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981; Hamermesh and 
                                                            
5 For instance, in response to unemployment concerns, instead of engaging in upward earnings management, firms 
may resort to income smoothing where income is managed upward in good periods and downward in bad periods. 
6 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8, OB2 and BC1.10 
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Wolfe, 1990; Li, 1986; Topel, 1984) to lay-off decisions (Topel, 1983), and corporate leverage 
decisions (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). In this paper, we provide strong evidence, using 
established identification techniques, that the state UI benefits affect corporate financial 
reporting decisions as well. Hence, we add to a growing literature about the positive externalities 
of UI (e.g., Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer, 2014).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the 
hypotheses. Section three describes the data and empirical design. Section four presents the 
results. Section five concludes.     
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
 In the United States, the Federal-State UI Program is an important safety net that 
provides temporary income to eligible workers who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own.7 Based on guidelines under federal law, each state administers a separate UI program. State 
laws determine the eligibility, amounts, and the duration of UI benefits. Most states fund their 
programs with taxation on employers, with three states requiring minimal employee 
contributions. The taxes imposed on the firms vary based on past experiences; firms that have 
had more worker unemployment claims in the past pay higher taxes.8 Claims for UI benefits are 
paid by state governments, which are allowed to tap federal funds after they use up their 
resources or reach certain rates of aggregate unemployment. Benefits are typically based on a 
percentage of an individual’s earnings over the most recent 52-week period and are limited to a 
                                                            
7 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp.  
8 See, for example, the determination of UI tax rates in Washington State: 
http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/faq/tax-rate-update-6-10.php.   
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maximum amount stipulated by the state. Most states allow for a maximum of 26 weeks of 
benefits.9 
 Many factors can lead to variation in UI benefits across states and times. Key factors 
include underlying economic conditions (e.g., higher average wages) and political forces (e.g., 
bolstering of political support). The direct effect of the UI program is on unemployed workers. 
Gruber (1997) argues that the primary benefit of UI benefits is to smooth consumption during 
periods of unemployment. In particular, he argues that pooling unemployment risk through 
insurance leads to greater efficiency and provides evidence that consumption would fall 
significantly in the absence of UI. Other studies have found that UI is associated with workers’ 
searches for new employment and the durations of their unemployment spells, labor productivity, 
savings, and stock market participation (e.g., Feldstein, 1978; Topel and Welch, 1980; Moffitt, 
1985; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1995; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000; Gormley, Liu, and 
Shou, 2010; Engen and Gruber, 2001; Meyer and Mok, 2007). Hsu et al. (2014) find that UI 
benefits help the unemployed avoid defaulting on their mortgage debt, and, as a result, banks 
extend credit and offer reduced interest rates to low income households. 
For firms, UI programs have a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect is the taxes 
that firms pay to fund the program. The indirect effect is via firms’ consideration of the impact of 
UI benefits on their workers. Topel (1983) finds that firms are more willing to lay off workers 
when workers are more protected by UI. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) hypothesize that firms will 
choose financial policies that decrease the risk of distress and costly layoffs when their workers 
are less protected by UI programs, because workers will demand higher compensation for 
                                                            
9 For a more detailed discussion of the institutional background of UI programs in the United States, see Agrawal 
and Matsa (2013). 
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potential job loss. Consistent with their hypothesis, they find that higher unemployment benefits 
lead to increased corporate leverage. 
 
2.1  The Relation between UI and Opacity 
Unemployment concerns potentially impact managerial decisions on financial reporting 
because both existing and prospective employees likely use firms’ accounting information to 
assess unemployment risk. As higher risk of unemployment leads to higher compensating wage 
differentials, firms have incentives to present the prospects of its employees in a brighter 
manner. 10  These compensating wage differentials can be quite substantial. For example, 
employing conservative assumptions, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) estimate the cost of 
compensating wage differentials to be 154 basis points of firm value for a BBB rated firm when 
there are no UI benefits. Chemmanur et al. (2013) find that incremental labor costs associated 
with higher unemployment risk due to added leverage are large enough to offset tax shield 
benefits of debt. 
In the United States, workers’ concerns over future unemployment are partially mitigated 
by the presence of the UI benefits programs as these programs provide unemployment income 
for workers in the event that they are laid off. In other words, workers’ unemployment concerns 
can be thought of as a function of both risk of unemployment and potential unemployment 
benefits. 
Unemployment Concerns = f(Unemployment risk, UI benefits)   Eq. (1) 
                                                            
10 Unemployment concerns could also impact internal reporting activities of rank and file workers. Therefore, to the 
extent that these are reflected in consolidated financial reports, internal reporting decisions of rank and file 
employees could be another source for a link between unemployment concerns and corporate level financial 
outcomes. However, as a practical matter it is not possible to empirically discern the impact of internal reporting by 
rank and file employees on corporate level financial reports.     
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When expected UI benefits are higher, future unemployment concerns are less. Following 
Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we use exogenous changes in state level UI benefits to empirically 
capture exogenous changes in unemployment concerns. Consistent with exogenous changes to 
UI benefits influencing firms’ reporting behavior, Dou et al. (2015) find that firms unwind their 
long run upward earnings management activities in response to increases in UI benefits. We note 
however that discretionary reporting behaviors induced by unemployment concerns need not be 
limited to upward earnings management activities. For example, unemployment concerns could 
also create income smoothing incentives where firms manage earnings downward during good 
times to create precautionary reserves that would be released during bad times so that the firm is 
projected as less risky (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). Relatedly, Hamm et al. (2013) 
argue that when faced with strong labor unions, firms have incentives not only to manage 
earnings downwards to shelter from unions’ rent seeking, but also to manage earnings upwards 
to avoid demands for higher compensating wage differentials due to higher risk of 
unemployment.  
Regardless of whether workers’ unemployment concerns induce upward earnings 
management or income smoothing incentives, the outcome would be more opaque financial 
reports. As more generous UI benefits reduce unemployment concerns and associated 
compensating wage differential costs, we would expect opacity to be negatively associated with 
UI benefits. 
Hence, our primary hypothesis is as follows (alternative form): 
Hypothesis H1: “Opacity is negatively associated with UI benefits.” 
Next we turn to a number of cross sectional tests that provide us with further insights on 
the relation between unemployment concerns and financial reporting. 
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2.2  The Effect of Unemployment Risk  
As expressed in equation (1), unemployment concerns are a function of both risk of 
unemployment and UI benefits. As expected costs of unemployment are increasing in the risk of 
unemployment, the benefits of generous UI programs would be particularly high when the 
employees’ exposure to unemployment risk is greater. For example, according to Agrawal and 
Matsa’s (2013) estimates, the average reduction in compensating wage differential costs due to 
UI programs is only 1 basis point of firm value for AAA rated firms, but is as much as 269 basis 
points of firm value for much riskier B rated firms. Therefore, if UI reduces opacity induced by 
unemployment concerns, then this reduction should be more pronounced when unemployment 
risk is higher and UI benefits are particularly important. Accordingly, we posit that; 
Hypothesis H2: “The negative association between opacity and UI benefits is 
stronger when unemployment risk is higher.” 
 
2.3  The Effect of Trade Unions 
 Viscusi (1980) argues that since trade unions promote the welfare of inframarginal 
workers, the wage received per unit of risk should be greater in unionized contexts. In other 
words, the compensation wage differentials should be higher in unionized firms because more 
risk-averse employees enjoy greater power in unionized settings. Consistent with this prediction, 
Viscusi (1980) finds compensating wage premium for risk of workplace injuries to be 
substantially higher in unionized contexts. Extending this to employment risk in terms of 
variations in hours worked, Moore (1995) finds a significantly larger compensating wage 
differential for unionized firms. In fact, Moore (1995) estimates wages in unionized firms to be 
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about 19% higher than those of non-unionized firms and attributes more than 75% of this 
difference to compensating wage differentials for unemployment risk. Relatedly, Hamm, Jung, 
and Lee (2013) find that firms faced with strong labor unions are more likely to have stronger 
incentives to manage earnings to project themselves as less risky.  
If concerns over unemployment risk are indeed more costly for unionized firms, then 
benefits of UI programs – including the effect of reducing opacity – should be greater for firms 
operating in highly unionized settings. Hence, our hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis H3: “The negative association between opacity and the UI benefits is stronger for 
firms operating in more unionized environments.” 
 
2.4 The Effect of Executive Equity Incentives 
 When managerial equity incentives are high, managers’ wealth is more closely tied to 
firm value (Hall and Liebman, 2000). Moreover, prior research on executive equity incentives 
suggests that executives have incentives to engage in discretionary reporting behavior when their 
equity portfolios make them less averse to firm risk (Armstrong, et al., 2013). Using both 
regression and matched sample designs, Armstrong et al. (2013) find that managers who are 
more sensitive to changes in equity risk (i.e. higher portfolio vega) are more likely to use 
discretionary accruals and have earnings restatements, after controlling for the effect of 
managers’ sensitivity to changes in equity value (i.e. portfolio delta), which prior studies also 
find to be positively associated with misreporting.11   
 In our first hypothesis we argue that managers engage in discretionary reporting behavior 
to obfuscate unemployment risks so that compensating wage differential costs are minimized. 
                                                            
11 See Armstrong et al. (2013) for a review of the extensive body of research examining the association between 
managers’ sensitivity to stock price and misreporting. 
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Minimizing these costs should, in turn, translate into higher firm value. Therefore, if our 
conjectures are correct, then the propensity to engage in opaque financial reporting due to 
workers’ unemployment concerns should be more pronounced when managers have high equity 
incentives. Hence, the role of UI benefits in reducing opacity should be greater when managers 
have higher equity incentives. Accordingly, our next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis H4: “The negative association between opacity and the UI benefits is 
stronger for firms managed by executives with greater equity incentives.” 
 
3.  Data and Empirical Framework 
Unlike most other countries, the level of UI benefits in the U.S. is determined at the state, as 
opposed to federal government level. Moreover, there are time series variations in UI benefits at 
the state level. As extensively discussed in Agrawal and Matsa (2013), these variations in UI 
benefits are quite exogenous to the firm. Accordingly, we use these cross-sectional (across 
states) and time-series (within state) variations in UI benefits to test our conjecture of a link 
between opacity and unemployment concerns.  
3.1  Data 
 We obtain data on UI from the U.S. Department of Labor’s annual issues of Significant 
Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws and data on firm financials from 
Compustat.12 We combine firm-level financial information with state-level UI data based on the 
state in which the firm’s headquarter is located.13 Following Hutton et al. (2009), we begin our 
sample period in 1991. Doing so allows us to estimate discretionary accruals using cash flow 
                                                            
12 http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp#sigprouilaws 
13 This matching criterion creates some measurement error with respect to variable of interest if some of the firm’s 
workers are located outside of the headquarter-state, since employees are covered by the UI laws of the state in 
which they are employed. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we address this issue by reporting results excluding 
industries with a dispersed workforce in our main analysis and conducting several cross-sectional analyses. 
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method (Hribar and Collins, 2002). We exclude firms in financial services and utilities industries 
(SIC 6000-6999 and SIC 4900-4948). We also exclude firms with insufficient data to calculate 
our opacity measure and the control variables. This results in a final sample of 63,186 firm-years 
over the sample period from 1991 to 2012.  
3.2  Measurement of UI Benefits 
 To analyze the impact of UI benefits on financial reporting, we use the maximum amount 
of unemployment insurance benefits (UI) allowed for each state in a given year, defined as the 
natural log of the maximum number of weeks that a state provides benefits to claimants (Max 
Duration), times the maximum weekly benefit amount (Max Weekly Benefit). This variable 
provides a proxy for the total UI benefits that a claimant can receive in a given year and has been 
shown to impact firms’ financial policies (Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). Panel A of Table 1 
presents summary statistics on the maximum duration, maximum weekly benefit, and total 
benefits for each of the fifty-one states in our sample. While there is little variation in the 
maximum number of weeks a worker can claim unemployment benefits for, the maximum 
amount of weekly benefits varies significantly, ranging from the lowest of $195.91 in 
Mississippi to $692.86 in Massachusetts. The maximum total benefit is also lowest in 
Mississippi ($5,093.64) and highest in Massachusetts ($20,785.91). Panel B of Table 1 shows the 
mean and median values of the maximum weekly benefit, maximum duration, and total benefits 
for each year in our sample period. Similar to Panel A, the maximum duration has remained 
quite steady over time, but the amount of benefits has almost doubled.   
[Insert Table 1] 
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One might look at these weekly and total numbers and consider them to be small relative 
to at least what some workers were receiving as employment income prior to being laid off. 
From a utility (or economic importance) perspective, it is important to note that the utility of a 
dollar of employment income is likely to be lower than the utility of a dollar of unemployment 
income because of the diminishing marginal utility of income. A key reason is that the earlier 
and later dollars are likely to be spent on necessities and luxury items, respectively. UI provides 
an important economic lifeline to many who have lost their jobs. It is also important to note that 
involuntary unemployment tends to increase sharply during period of economic crisis when the 
wealth of many individuals falls significantly and there are few job opportunities. The marginal 
utility per dollar of income – in particular, unemployment income – is likely to be greater during 
these periods. 
3.3  Measurement of Financial Reporting Opacity 
  Following Hutton et al. (2009), we measure Opacity as the sum of the absolute abnormal 
accruals from year t-1 to year t+1, where abnormal accruals are estimated based on the cross-
sectional modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). Specifically, we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression in each two-digit SIC industry for each fiscal year.14 
Total	Accruals୧,୲
Assets୧,୲ିଵ ൌ ߚ଴
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵ
∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ
ܲܲܧ௜,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧						ܧݍ. ሺ2ሻ 
Abnormal accruals are then calculated based on the following equation, using the coefficient 
estimates from Eq. (2). 
                                                            
14 We require at least twenty observations for each industry-year regression. 
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Abnormal	Accruals୧,୲
ൌ Total	Accruals୧,୲Assets୧,୲ିଵ െ ሺβ଴
෢ 1ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ βଵ
෢∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ െ ∆ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒܾ݈ܽ݁ݏ௜,௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ିଵ
൅ βଶ෢ ܲܲܧ௜,௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ିଵሻ					ܧݍ. ሺ3ሻ
15 
Then, 
Opacityt = |Abnormal Accrualsi,t-1| + |Abnormal Accrualsi,t| + |Abnormal Accrualsi,t+1|   Eq. (4)  
3.4  Impact of Unemployment Risk on Reporting Opacity 
 We employ the following OLS model to examine the relation between UI benefits and 
corporate reporting: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8
 =   +  +  
                 +  + +  +  
                 + 
t t t t
t t t t
Opacity UI Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility
Leverage Log Sales Market to Book Return on Assets
Proportion of  Fixed Ass
b b b b
b b b b
b
+
9 10
11
 +  + 
+ +  +          (5)
t t t
t
ets Zscore Unemployment Rate  
                 GDP Growth  Firm and Year Fixed Effects Eq.
b b
b e
 
 Opacity, as defined previously is the dependent variable. Our main variable of interest, 
UI, is the natural log of maximum unemployment benefits available to claimants. We control for 
various firm level variables that could potentially influence firms’ propensity to produce opaque 
financial statements.  Hribar and Nichols (2007) show that it is important to control for operating 
volatility when one uses absolute discretionary accruals to test for earnings management as lack 
of fit in the discretionary accruals models increases the value of absolute discretionary accruals 
and can bias tests in favor of rejecting the null of no discretion in reported earnings. As such, we 
                                                            
15 The inclusion of ΔReceivablesi,t modifies the Jones (1991) model to account for the change in sales that could be 
due to the aggressive recognition of questionable sales (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). Results remain 
qualitatively the same when we simply use the residual in Eq. (2) to measure abnormal accruals. 
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control for both cash flow and sales volatility, where Cash Flow Volatility and Sales Volatility 
are the standard deviations of operating cash flows and revenue, respectively, deflated by assets 
over the current and prior four years. We also control for leverage because Agrawal and Matsa 
(2013) show that firms use more conservative financing policies when unemployment risk is 
high. Leverage is total debt divided by market value of equity. We also include variables that 
proxy for growth and performance, such as Sales, Market to Book, and Return on Assets, as they 
are likely to be determinants of earnings management. Following Agrawal and Matsa (2013), we 
also control for the probability of bankruptcy (Z-score) and the importance of firm collateral 
(Proportion of Fixed Assets). In addition, Unemployment Rate and GDP Growth are two state-
level variables that capture local economic conditions that may affect firms’ financial reporting 
decisions. We also include firm fixed effects to ensure that the hypothesized relation is driven by 
changes in UI over time, rather than by any time invariant firm characteristics, and year fixed 
effects to control aggregate macroeconomic conditions.  We cluster standard errors by state to 
correct for potential correlations among firms within the same state.16 
 Table 2 reports summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean of Opacity is 0.232 with a standard 
deviation of 0.249. For comparison, Hutton et al. (2009) report a mean of 0.243 and a standard 
deviation of 0.222 for their sample period from 1991 to 2005. The mean of UI is 9.083, 
equivalent to 8,804 dollars. Panel B provides Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients among 
the variables in the upper (lower) diagonal. As predicted, the correlation between UI and Opacity 
is negative and significant (p<0.01).  
                                                            
16 Agrawal and Matsa (2013) argue that it is more appropriate to cluster at the state level because the variation in UI 
benefits is at the state level, and this controls for potential time-varying correlations in unobserved factors that affect 
different firms within the same state. They also argue that this also corrects for within-firm error term correlations 
over time, and as a result is more general than firm-level clustering. 
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[Insert Table 2] 
4.  Results 
4.1 Test of H1: Relation between UI Benefits and Financial Reporting Opacity 
Table 3 presents results for tests of our main hypothesis that reporting opacity is 
negatively associated with the level of state-level UI benefits. Column (1) includes all firm-years 
in the sample while column (2) reports results excluding industries with a dispersed workforce 
(i.e. retail, wholesale, and transport). In column (1), the negative coefficient on UI suggests that 
an increase in unemployment benefits reduces reporting opacity (β=-0.031, p<0.05).  When we 
restrict our sample to industries with less-dispersed workers (Columns (2)), the results are even 
stronger (β=-0.044, p<0.01), further supporting our hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 We now examine whether the relation between UI benefits and opacity varies across 
multiple hypothesized dimensions, to provide further support for our hypothesis that higher 
unemployment risk leads to more opaque reporting.  
4.2 Test of H2: Effect of Unemployment Risk 
 Hypothesis H2 predicts that the relation between UI and reporting opacity should be 
stronger when unemployment risk is higher. As illustrated in equation (1), unemployment 
concerns are a function of both unemployment risk and UI benefits. From the workers’ 
perspective, unemployment risk represents both (1) risk of being involuntarily laid-off and (2) 
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risk of being unable to find another job quickly. While (1) is dictated by firm risk, (2) is dictated 
by broader labor market conditions.17  
 Clearly, employees’ risk of unemployment increases with the bankruptcy risk of the firm 
because employees are laid off en masse in events of bankruptcy. Prior research also suggests 
that unemployment risk is higher for firms with difficulty in obtaining external funding, as firms 
respond to financial constraints induced negative shocks by laying-off employees (John, Lang, 
and Netter, 1992; Ofek, 1993).  Ceteris paribus, firms with low operating cash flows have more 
difficulty raising external capital due to liquidity concerns. Therefore, to examine whether firms 
with higher unemployment risk are more likely to produce more opaque financial reports, we 
partition our sample on likelihood of bankruptcy and operating cash flows. Following prior 
research, we use modified Altman’s z-score to proxy for bankruptcy risks.18  
 We use U.S. Department of Labor’s UI claim data to capture unemployment risk 
associated with difficulty of being reemployed. An important feature of the Federal-State UI 
Program is that eligible UI claimants have to promptly contact their State UI agency after 
becoming unemployed. The U.S. Department of Labor consolidates the claims from the various 
states and produces a weekly nationwide jobless claims report that reflects the employment 
situation in the United States.19 This report is important for macroeconomic analyses, and the 
financial markets rely on this report to make projections about government policies (Balduzzi, 
Elton, and Green, 2001). In this report, there is a breakdown of the claims filed within each state. 
                                                            
17 Individual worker ability is a third factor that influences unemployment risk. However, this risk is unlikely to be 
compensated for via compensating wage differentials.  
18 The modified Altman’s z-score is estimated using the following equation: 3.3ୣୟ୰୬୧୬୥ୱ	ୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ	୧୬୲ୣ୰ୣୱ୲	ୟ୬ୢ	୲ୟ୶ୣୱ୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୟୱୱୣ୲ୱ ൅
1.0 ୱୟ୪ୣୱ୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୟୱୱୣ୲ୱ ൅ 1.4
୰ୣ୲ୟ୧୬ୣୢ	ୣୟ୰୬୧୬୥ୱ
୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୟୱୱୣ୲ୱ ൅ 1.2
୵୭୰୩୧୬୥	ୡୟ୮୧୲ୟ୪
୲୭୲ୟ୪	ୟୱୱୣ୲ୱ  
19 These reports are disclosed to the public in the form of news releases and can be found at: 
http://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf. 
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For states with significant increases or decreases in the claims, there is a state supplied comment 
about the underlying reason for the significant changes. More UI claimants is an indicator of 
relatively higher reemployment risk for the workers in a state because a higher unemployed 
worker pool within the state reflects more competition in finding a job should a currently 
employed worker lose his/her job. Therefore, we use UI payment rates, defined as the number of 
individuals collecting unemployment benefits in a state scaled by state population, to capture the 
difficulty of becoming reemployed. We obtain data on unemployment collections and state 
populations from the Current Population Survey. Higher UI payment rates reflect greater 
difficulty of becoming reemployed in the event of unemployment. 
We separately estimate Eq. (5) for firms with high and low z-scores, cash flows, and state 
level UI payment rates where firms are stratified at the median of the sample values. We report 
the results in Table 4. Consistent with our hypothesis that riskier firms are more likely to take 
into account UI benefits in their financial reporting decisions, we only find a significant and 
negative relation between UI and Opacity in the high bankruptcy risk (p<0.01), and low cash 
flow subsamples (p<0.1). Similarly, underscoring the role of reemployment risk, we find the 
significant negative relation between UI and Opacity to be present for firms domiciled in high UI 
payment rate states (p<0.1), but not for those in low UI payment rate states. In sum, results 
reported in Table 4 indicate that the role of UI benefits in reducing opacity is greater when 
unemployment risk is higher.    
[Insert Table 4] 
4.3 Test of H3: Effect of Trade Unions 
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 To examine the effect of unionized labor on the relation between UI and opacity (H3), we 
use two proxies that likely capture the level of union intensity (both measured at state level). The 
first proxy is the percentage of employees who are union members. The second proxy is the 
percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements based on figures reported. 
We obtain data on union membership from the Unionstats database maintained by Barry T. 
Hirsch and David A. Macpherson.20 We separately estimate Eq. (5) for firms with high and low 
union membership and collective bargaining power and report the results in Table 5. Consistent 
with H3, we find a significant and negative relation between UI and Opacity only in the high 
union intensity subsamples in Table 5. The negative coefficients on UI (β=-0.038 and β=-0.035, 
p<0.05 and p<0.05) provide support for H3 and suggest that reduction in opacity due to 
availability of generous UI benefits is more prevalent in firms with highly unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 5] 
4.4 Test of H4: Effect of Top Executives’ Equity Incentives 
 Since unemployment risk has a negative effect on firm value, managers with incentives 
tied to firm value are more likely to be concerned about the impact of unemployment costs on 
firm value and consequently on their own wealth. This suggests that the relation between UI 
benefits and reporting opacity should be stronger for firms managed by executives with high 
equity incentives. To test H4, we group firms based on the pay-performance sensitivity (delta) 
and risk-taking incentives (vega) of the firm’s top five executives. Vega and delta are calculated 
following the procedures used in Core and Guay (2002). We then separately estimate Eq. (5) for 
firms with high and low managerial equity incentives and report the results in Table 6. Firms 
                                                            
20 http://unionstats.gsu.edu/ 
21 
 
with both vega and delta above (below) the sample median are classified as having high (low) 
equity incentives.21 Consistent with our hypothesis, we only find a significant and negative 
relation between UI and Opacity in the high equity incentives sub-sample (β=-0.059, p<0.01).  
[Insert Table 6] 
4.5  Robustness Tests 
4.5.1 Controlling for future UI Benefits 
 To provide further identification of the causal relation between UI benefits and reporting 
opacity, we perform a robustness analysis in this section and control for UI benefits in future 
years. If poor local economic conditions lead firms to engage in earnings management, and state 
governments increase UI payments due to political pressure, then we can expect a negative 
relation between Opacity and forward values of total UI benefits. Thus, we estimate the 
following regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
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 =   +  +  +  + 
                 + +  +  + 
                 + 
+t t t+1 t+2 t t
t t t t
Opacity UI UI UI Cash Flow Volatility Sales Volatility
Leverage Log Sales Market to Book Return on Assets
Prop
b b b b b b
b b b b
b 11 12
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 +  + 
                 +  +          (6)
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t
ortion of  Fixed Assets Zscore Unemployment Rate
GDP Growth Eq.  
                 
b b
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, where we include UI measured in year t+1 and year t+2 to Eq. (5). The results reported in Table 
7 show that there is no relation between forward values of UI benefits and our opacity measure. 
tLog Max Total Benefit  also remains negative and significant in both columns. Overall, this 
suggests that it is the UI benefits that affect opacity, and not vice versa. 
                                                            
21 If a firm either has high vega and low delta or low delta and high vega, it is not included in the analyses. In other 
words, we are comparing firms with high vega and high delta against firms with low vega and low delta. Ex-ante, 
predictions for the mixed combinations are ambiguous. 
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[Insert Table 7] 
4.5.2 Controlling for increases in UI 
Next, we consider potential nonlinearity between UI benefits and opacity. In particular, 
we conjecture that that UI likely have a more salient effect of financial reporting decisions when 
there has been a recent increase in UI benefits because of the attention that these increases 
attracts. To examine the effect of recent increases in UI benefits on the relation between UI 
benefits and opacity, we create two subsamples, one consisting of firms in states with an increase 
in UI benefits from the prior year and one consisting of other firms. Since higher UI reduces 
unemployment costs for rank and file employees, an increase in UI benefits should lead to a 
stronger relation between UI and Opacity. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 present the results of 
the subsample with and without recent increases in UI, respectively. We find a negative and 
significant coefficient in column (1) but not in column (2) (β=-0.073 and β=-0.020, p<0.1 and 
p=0.22), consistent with a recency effect. This further confirms our hypothesis that increases in 
UI payment rates lead to lower reporting opacity.  
[Insert Table 8] 
4.5.3 Alternative Measures of Opacity 
In this section, we use two alternative measures to capture opacity. The first is accruals 
quality (AQ), measured as the standard deviation of three firm-specific residuals from a cross-
sectional regression of accruals on the prior, current, and future cash flow from operations, as 
well as the changes in revenue and PP&E (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002). Unlike 
our main opacity measure, which requires three years of data to compute, AQ requires five years 
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of data because it requires lead and lag cash flow from operations.22 Specifically, to obtain AQ, 
we follow Francis et al. (2005) and estimate the following cross-sectional regression for each of 
the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry groups with at least 20 firms in fiscal year t. 
0 1 2 3 4 5
, , 1 , , 1 , , ,i t i i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i tTCA CFO CFO CFO REV PPE v                      Eq. (7) 
where TCAi,t = ΔCAi,t - ΔCLi,t - ΔCashi,t + ΔSTDebti,t – Depni,t = total current accruals,  CFOi,t = 
NIBEi,t – TCAi,t = cash flow from operations, NIBEi,t = net income before extraordinary items, 
ΔCAi,t = change in current assets,  ΔCLi,t = change in current liabilities, ΔCashi,t = change in cash, 
ΔSTDebti,t = change in debt in current liabilities, Depni,t = depreciation and amortization expense, 
ΔREVi,t = change in revenues, and PPEi,t = gross value of plant, property, and equipment. The 
annual cross-sectional regression produces firm-year residuals. For each firm in each fiscal year, 
the standard deviation of the residuals for fiscal years t-1 to t+1 is computed. Five years of data 
are required to obtain the residuals because of the inclusion of cash flow from operations at t-1 
and t+1. As a result, the sample size is smaller when we use this measure of reporting opacity in 
our specifications (43,608 observations). 
AQt = S.D.(Residualsi,t-1, Residualsi,t, and Residualsi,t+1)     Eq. (8) 
In our main tests we follow Hutton et al. (2009) and capture opacity for year t as the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals for the three-year-period t-1, t, and t+1. Our second 
alternative measure of opacity relaxes the requirement of an arbitrary time window and measures 
opacity for year t as the mean of absolute abnormal accruals from t to t+n-1, where n is the 
number of years before UI benefits subsequently change (Modified_Opacity). Modified_Opacity 
                                                            
22 The typical computation of AQ requires seven years of data because of the use of five years of abnormal accruals 
to compute AQ. To be consistent with how Opacity is measured, we use three years of abnormal accruals for this 
robustness analyses. 
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accommodates the notion that unemployment concern driven opacity levels may remain 
unchanged until a change in UI benefits occurs. The advantage of this alternative measure is that 
it better captures changes in reporting behavior directly due to changes in UI benefits.  
Table 9 documents the results of repeating our analyses of H1 with AQ and 
Modified_Opacity. Note that the higher the AQ and Modified_Opacity measures, the lower the 
accruals quality. The results are consistent with those in Table 3. In column (1), the negative 
coefficients on UI suggest that an increase in unemployment benefits reduces AQ (β=-0.008, 
p<0.01).  In column (3), the negative coefficients on UI suggest that an increase in 
unemployment benefits reduces Modified_Opacity (β=-0.014, p<0.05).  When we restrict our 
sample to industries with less dispersed workers, the results are even stronger for both measures 
(β=-0.012 and -0.018, p<0.01 and 0.05, respectively), further supporting our main hypothesis. In 
untabulated analyses, we also repeat the tests of all the other hypotheses. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those documented earlier. 
[Insert Table 9] 
4.6.4  Effect of UI on the Relation between Opacity and Firm Value 
All our hypotheses are based on the conjecture that one reason for financial reporting 
opacity is firms’ attempts to present prospects of its employees in a brighter manner so that 
costly compensating wage differentials are minimized. UI benefits reduce the need for opacity 
due to lowering of these compensating wage differentials. All results reported so far are 
consistent with this notion. In this section, we directly investigate the veracity of this conjecture 
by examining the whether and how UI benefits impact the relation between opacity and firm 
value. 
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Notwithstanding unintended consequences such as greater crash risk (Hutton et al., 
2009), if opacity is an outcome of managers’ efforts to minimize negative firm value 
consequences of workers’ unemployment concerns, we should observe a positive association 
between opacity and firm value when UI benefits are low. Moreover, if generous UI benefits 
weaken managers’ economic rationale for opaque reporting we would expect the relation 
between opacity and firm value to be less positive when UI benefits are high. Accordingly, we 
empirically investigate these predictions by employing the following regression model where 
firm value, measured in terms of Tobin’s Q, is regressed on both UI and Opacity along with their 
interaction term: 
0 1 2 3 4
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Table 10 presents the results of our estimation of equation (9). We present results for two 
alternative definitions of Tobin’s Q that are widely used in the literature. In column (1), Tobin’s 
Q is defined as market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Market value of assets 
equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of the book 
value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. In column (2), Tobin’s Q is defined as 
book value of liabilities plus the market value of common stock less the sum of the book value of 
common stock, balance sheet deferred taxes, preferred stocks, and investment tax credit, divided 
by the book value of assets.  
The variable High UI takes the value of one if UI benefits are above the cross sectional 
median, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the variable Opacity indicates the relation 
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between opacity and Tobin’s Q when UI benefits are low. If firms engage in opaque financial 
reporting to minimize costly compensating wage differentials, we would expect the coefficient 
on Opacity to be positive. Moreover, if generous UI benefits reduce these costs and weaken the 
economic rationale for opacity, we would expect the coefficient on the interaction term 
Opacity×High UI to be negative.  
As predicted, we find the coefficient on Opacity to be positive and significant in both 
columns A and B of Table 10 (β= 0.942 and 0.981, p<0.01 and <0.01, respectively), indicating 
that, when UI benefits are low, opacity is associated with managerial attempts to preserve firm 
value. Moreover, we find the coefficient on the interaction term Opacity×High UI to be 
significantly negative (β= -0.669 and -0.634, p<0.01 and <0.05, respectively). This suggests that 
firm-value-driven incentives for opaque financial reporting is lower when UI benefits are more 
generous and as a result costs of compensating wage differentials are likely lower. The results 
reported in Table 10 provide direct evidence on our conjecture that opacity due to unemployment 
concerns is driven by managers’ attempts to maximize firm value by minimizing costly 
compensating wage differentials.  
[Insert Table 10] 
5.  Conclusion 
The labor economics theory on compensating wage differentials suggests that firms have 
incentives to reduce the actual and/or perceived unemployment risk of workers because, ex-ante, 
this would lower the cost of compensating the workers.  Given that standard setters identify 
employees as a key user group of financial statements, it is important to examine whether the 
unemployment concerns of workers affect financial reporting opacity. 
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Using exogenous inter-state cross-sectional and intra-state time-series variations in US UI 
benefits to identify changes in unemployment concerns, we show that more generous state UI 
benefits, which reduce workers’ concerns about unemployment risk, result in less opaque 
financial reporting by firms. This effect of UI benefits on financial reporting opacity is 
interesting because it is likely to be an unintended outcome of state-level labor policies. It is hard 
to imagine that policy makers, in their deliberations about UI policies, consider firm-level 
financial reporting consequences of their policy decisions. To add richness to our study about the 
effect of UI benefits on financial reporting opacity, we show that the relation is stronger when 
workers face higher unemployment risk, workers’ labor union participation is high and top 
executives have high equity incentives. Consistent with our conjecture that opacity is an outcome 
of managers’ attempts to minimize compensating wage differential costs, we show that opacity is 
positively related to firm value when UI benefits are low and that this relation weakens as UI 
benefits become more generous.  
 Reverse causality and endogeneity are serious concerns that preclude the researcher from 
making strong causal inferences in empirical studies in financial economics. While our study is 
not completely devoid of these concerns, we believe that our institutional setting and research 
design choices allay them to a great extent. First, since we capture UI benefits at the state level, it 
is unlikely that reverse causality explains our results as it is difficult to conjecture a situation 
where UI benefits at the state level are affected by financial reporting quality at the firm level. 
We further substantiate this conjecture by showing that opacity is not associated with future UI 
benefits. 
Second, while it is conceptually plausible to conjecture broader economic factors 
affecting both UI benefits and the firms’ accounting quality and thereby raising concerns over 
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omitted correlated variables, it appears that from a practical standpoint changes in UI benefits are 
driven more by political considerations rather than underlying economics. For example, in the 
state of Florida, maximum UI benefits remained constant over the period of 1998-2011 despite 
notable fluctuations of the economy whereas states such as Connecticut and Massachusetts 
increased their UI benefits almost annually during the same period. Lending support to this 
notion, Agrawal and Matsa (2013) report that in contrast to broader economic indicators, there 
are no regional trends in UI benefits. Moreover, in all our analyses, we control for state-level 
unemployment and GDP growth rates to capture state-wide economic conditions and employ 
year fixed effects to control for broad time series trends.23 Third, as expected, we obtain stronger 
results by removing industries with more dispersed workforces from our analyses. Fourth, 
rendering support for a causal relation, we obtain expected results for all our cross sectional tests. 
Fifth, in line with broader conjectures of our paper, we show that opacity is positively associated 
with firm value when UI benefits are low and that this association is tempered by the presence of 
more generous UI benefits.  
How firms’ financial reporting outcomes are shaped by concerns of rank and file 
members of the workforce is an important, yet under-researched issue in the corporate disclosure 
literature. Meanwhile, both labor economists and regulators alike are likely interested in the 
broader, unintended effects of labor market interventions such as UI programs. In this light, we 
believe this paper to be of interest to a broad array of audiences. While our paper indicates a link 
between UI benefits and accruals-based financial reporting decisions, it is plausible that UI 
benefits influence other decisions related to disclosure such as real earnings management and 
earnings guidance. We leave the exploration of such issues to future research.  
  
                                                            
23 We also employ firm fixed effects to ensure that results are not driven by time invariant firm factors. 
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Table 1 Panel A: Average Unemployment Insurance Benefits by State 
State 
Max 
Weekly 
Benefit 
Max Duration Unemployment Insurance State 
Max Weekly 
Benefit Max Duration 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Alabama 204.32 26.00 5312.27 Montana 295.77 26.73 7972.82 
Alaska 332.36 26.00 8641.45 Nebraska 240.91 26.00 6263.64 
Arizona 208.64 26.00 5424.55 Nevada 298.86 26.00 7770.45 
Arkansas 330.73 25.95 8578.14 New Hampshire 310.14 26.00 8063.55 
California 328.18 26.00 8532.73 New Jersey 450.82 26.00 11721.27 
Colorado 361.77 26.00 9406.09 New Mexico 306.86 26.00 7978.45 
Connecticut 474.00 26.00 12324.00 New York 360.45 26.00 9371.82 
Delaware 304.32 26.00 7912.27 North Dakota 305.77 26.00 7950.09 
District of Columbia 336.27 26.00 8743.09 North Carolina 378.09 26.00 9830.36 
Florida 264.77 25.86 6846.59 Ohio 407.50 26.00 10595.00 
Georgia 263.64 26.00 6854.55 Oklahoma 295.09 26.00 7672.36 
Hawaii 410.23 26.00 10665.91 Oregon 378.82 26.00 9849.27 
Idaho 291.09 26.00 7568.36 Pennsylvania 440.05 26.00 11441.18 
Illinois 411.82 25.95 10682.32 Rhode Island 513.36 26.00 13347.45 
Indiana 293.45 26.00 7629.82 South Dakota 229.09 26.00 5956.36 
Iowa 343.55 26.00 8932.18 South Carolina 259.73 25.73 6664.00 
Kansas 327.45 26.00 8513.82 Tennessee 246.36 26.00 6405.45 
Kentucky 314.55 26.00 8178.18 Texas 313.23 26.00 8143.91 
Louisiana 227.86 26.00 5924.45 Utah 339.55 26.00 8828.18 
Maine 400.55 26.00 10414.18 Vermont 308.05 26.00 8009.18 
Maryland 298.05 26.00 7749.18 Virginia 281.45 26.00 7317.82 
Massachusetts 692.86 30.00 20785.91 Washington 436.18 28.55 12311.45 
Michigan 325.05 25.73 8352.45 West Virginia 339.95 26.00 8838.82 
Minnesota 423.59 26.00 11013.36 Wisconsin 307.23 26.00 7987.91 
Mississippi 195.91 26.00 5093.64 Wyoming 297.05 26.00 7723.18 
Missouri 238.64 25.73 6117.27 
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Table 1 Panel B: Average Unemployment Insurance Benefits by Year 
Max Weekly Benefit Max Duration Unemployment Insurance 
Year N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1991 2740 247.51 228 26.26 26 6537.27 5928 
1992 2725 258.87 231 26.25 26 6835.53 6006 
1993 2884 270.06 250 26.26 26 7135.36 6500 
1994 3060 277.56 250 26.27 26 7341.66 6500 
1995 3258 282.36 265 26.27 26 7471.43 6890 
1996 3510 286.32 263 26.27 26 7576.75 6838 
1997 3676 294.94 272 26.29 26 7818.89 7072 
1998 3564 305.00 281 26.29 26 8084.90 7306
1999 3557 316.90 290 26.30 26 8399.46 7540 
2000 3459 322.76 297 26.29 26 8553.87 7722 
2001 3207 348.89 300 26.31 26 9274.60 7800 
2002 3165 380.18 330 26.33 26 10115.47 8580 
2003 2972 395.95 370 26.33 26 10521.52 9620 
2004 2829 406.45 410 26.32 26 10788.10 10660 
2005 2686 422.96 426 26.24 26 11184.36 11076 
2006 2589 429.04 442 26.24 26 11337.64 11492 
2007 2458 445.45 450 26.25 26 11793.19 11700 
2008 2397 456.36 450 26.26 26 12093.51 11700 
2009 2243 468.40 450 26.25 26 12416.36 11700 
2010 2148 473.90 450 26.25 26 12552.25 11700 
2011 2069 476.67 450 26.24 26 12622.11 11700 
2012 1990   486.45 450   25.89 26   12767.58 11700 
 
Panel A (B) shows the distribution of maximum weekly benefit and maximum number of weeks allowed by state (year) for the sample period 1991-2012. UI is 
the average of the maximum unemployment benefit allowed, defined as the product of the maximum weekly benefit times the maximum number of weeks 
allowed.  
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Table 2 Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  N Mean Standard 
Deviation
25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile Dependent Variables 
Opacity 63,186 0.232 0.249 0.101 0.171 0.288 
UI Variable 
UI  63,186 9.083 0.353 8.799 9.054 9.308 
Control Variables 
Cash Flow Volatility 63,186 0.095 0.161 0.034 0.058 0.103 
Sales Volatility 63,186 0.223 0.233 0.087 0.155 0.273 
Log Sales 63,186 5.143 2.213 3.673 5.158 6.655 
Market to Book 63,186 3.588 24.181 1.175 1.969 3.397 
Return on Assets 63,186 0.010 0.241 -0.012 0.067 0.121 
Proportion of Fixed Assets 63,186 0.008 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 63,186 0.447 0.968 0.007 0.131 0.438 
Z-score 63,186 1.037 3.981 0.769 1.859 2.693 
Unemployment Rate 63,186 5.947 1.907 4.629 5.444 6.846 
GDP Growth 63,186 5.014 2.720 3.530 5.130 6.910 
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Table 2 Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Opacity 1.00 -0.02 0.25 0.20 -0.30 0.06 -0.32 -0.07 -0.04 -0.27 -0.02 0.01 
(2) UI -0.05 1.00 0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.06 -0.19 -0.09 -0.10 0.10 -0.29 
(3) Cash Flow Volatility 0.47 -0.02 1.00 0.24 -0.35 0.07 -0.43 -0.06 -0.08 -0.40 0.00 0.01 
(4) Sales Volatility 0.28 -0.08 0.42 1.00 -0.14 0.03 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 
(5) Log Sales -0.39 0.10 -0.53 -0.19 1.00 -0.04 0.50 0.02 0.09 0.43 0.03 -0.08 
(6) Market to Book 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.04 1.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.01 
(7) Return on Assets -0.28 -0.05 -0.36 -0.13 0.47 0.24 1.00 0.06 0.02 0.75 -0.01 0.02 
(8) Proportion of Fixed Assets -0.09 -0.22 -0.11 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.07 1.00 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.02 
(9) Leverage -0.13 -0.14 -0.25 -0.03 0.26 -0.37 -0.05 0.12 1.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 
(10) Z-score -0.23 -0.09 -0.28 0.01 0.43 -0.06 0.69 0.11 -0.02 1.00 -0.04 0.03 
(11) Unemployment Rate -0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.18 -0.05 -0.03 1.00 -0.46 
(12) GDP Growth 0.02 -0.30 0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.41 1.00 
 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the study. Panel A presents descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations in the upper (lower) diagonal. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the sum of absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI is the 
log of maximum total benefits. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of operating cash flows. Sales Volatility is the standard deviation of sales. Log 
Sales is the log of sales. Market to Book is market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Return on Assets is earnings before extraordinary items scaled 
by lag total assets. Proportion of Fixed Assets is the PP&E scaled by total assets. Leverage is total debt scaled by market value of equity. Z-score is the modified 
Altman Z-score. Unemployment Rate is state-level unemployment rate. GDP Growth is state-level growth in GDP. 
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Table 3: Impact of Unemployment Insurance 
  (1) (2)
Opacity Opacity 
      
UI -0.031** -0.044*** 
(0.014) (0.013) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.072*** 0.074*** 
(0.019) (0.022) 
Sales Volatility 0.079*** 0.100*** 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Log Sales -0.006 -0.004 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Market to Book 0.000* 0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.125*** -0.121*** 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets -0.013 -0.008 
(0.027) (0.033) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Z-score 0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
GDP Growth 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 63,186 53,614 
R-squared 0.405 0.404 
 
This table presents regression results on reporting opacity. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the sum of 
absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI is the log of maximum total benefits. Control variables are 
defined in Table 2. Industries with a dispersed workforce are excluded in column (2). We report coefficient 
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4: Role of Firm Risk 
 
Low Z-score High Z-score Low Cash Flows High Cash Flows 
High UI Payment 
Rates 
Low UI Payment 
Rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Opacity Opacity Opacity Opacity Opacity Opacity
UI -0.049*** -0.012 -0.035* -0.014 -0.080*** 0.015 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015) (0.026) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.043** 0.204** 0.046** 0.195* 0.072** 0.058* 
(0.017) (0.076) (0.019) (0.105) (0.028) (0.033) 
Sales Volatility 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.072*** 0.107*** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.024) 
Log Sales -0.001 -0.018*** -0.001 -0.015*** 0.005 -0.008 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
Market to Book 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.154*** 0.023 -0.110*** -0.147** -0.129** -0.148*** 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.026) (0.059) (0.049) (0.024) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets 0.080 -0.033 -0.004 -0.007 0.000 -0.027 
(0.066) (0.031) (0.059) (0.025) (0.000) (0.346) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 -0.008*** 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) 
Z-score 0.002 0.005* 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004* 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP Growth -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 31,405 31,781 31,492 31,694 24,987 23,508 
R-squared 0.495 0.338 0.542 0.270 0.230 0.534 
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This table presents regression results on firm risk. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the sum of absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI 
is the log of maximum total benefits. We split the sample into high and low z-score, cash flows, and UI payment rates based on the sample median of Z-score, 
Operating Cash Flows, and UI payment rates. UI payment is the number of UI claims scaled by state population. Control variables are defined in Table 2. We 
report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5: Role of Labor Unions 
  High Union 
Membership
Low Union 
Membership
High Collective 
Bargaining Power 
Low Collective 
Bargaining Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Opacity Opacity Opacity Opacity
  
UI -0.038** -0.009 -0.035** -0.032 
(0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.079*** 0.067* 0.072*** 0.080* 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.017) (0.040) 
Sales Volatility 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.067*** 0.083*** 
(0.011) (0.025) (0.012) (0.024) 
Log Sales 0.000 -0.011 -0.002 -0.009 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
Market to Book 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.098*** -0.140*** -0.083*** -0.170*** 
(0.034) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets 0.001 -0.033 0.006 -0.027 
(0.033) (0.048) (0.033) (0.048) 
Leverage -0.003* -0.002* -0.003* -0.003** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Z-score -0.002 0.003 -0.003* 0.005*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP Growth -0.001 0.001* -0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 32,238 30,948 31,590 31,596 
R-squared 0.361 0.513 0.348 0.518 
 
This table presents regression results on union intensity. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the sum of 
absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI is the log of maximum total benefits. We split the sample 
into high and low union membership and collective bargaining power based on the sample median of union 
membership and employee bargaining power. Union membership is the percentage of employees that are union 
members. Collective bargaining power is the percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
Control variables are defined in Table 2. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based 
on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6: Role of Executive Equity Incentives  
 
  
High Equity Incentives Low Equity Incentives 
(1) (2)
Opacity Opacity
      
UI -0.059*** -0.019 
(0.021) (0.040) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.456*** 0.332*** 
(0.123) (0.070) 
Sales Volatility 0.039** 0.063*** 
(0.015) (0.016) 
Log Sales 0.001 -0.010** 
(0.010) (0.005) 
Market to Book 0.000** 0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Return on Assets -0.135 -0.170*** 
(0.097) (0.033) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets 0.147 0.001 
(0.132) (0.074) 
Leverage -0.004 0.000 
(0.010) (0.003) 
Z-score -0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.005) 
Unemployment Rate -0.000 -0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) 
GDP Growth -0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 7,764 13,908 
R-squared 0.526 0.465 
 
This table presents regression results on executive equity incentives. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the 
sum of absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI is the log of maximum total benefits. We split the 
sample into high and low equity incentives, where equity incentives is defined as the sensitivity to stock price (i.e. 
delta) and stock volatility (i.e. vega) for the firm’s top five executives. The high equity incentives sample includes 
firm-years with vega and delta above the median. Firm-years with delta and vega below the sample median are 
classified as low equity incentives. Control variables are defined in Table 2. We report coefficient estimates and 
standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7: Controlling for Future Unemployment Insurance  
  (1) (2)
Opacity Opacity 
      
UI (t) -0.055** -0.063*** 
(0.021) (0.017) 
UI (t+1) 0.029 0.023 
(0.020) (0.022) 
UI (t+2) -0.005 -0.006 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.073*** 0.075*** 
(0.018) (0.022) 
Sales Volatility 0.078*** 0.098*** 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Log Sales -0.007 -0.004 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.122*** -0.118*** 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets -0.010 -0.005 
(0.027) (0.033) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Z-score 0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate 0.002 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
GDP Growth 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 61,196 51,880 
R-squared 0.387 0.378 
 
This table presents regression results controlling for future unemployment benefits. Opacity is from Hutton et al. 
(2009) and is the sum of absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI is the log of maximum total 
benefits. Industries with a dispersed workforce are excluded in column (2). Control variables are defined in Table 2. 
We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8: Impact of Recent Increases in Unemployment Insurance 
  Increase No Increase 
(1) (2)
Opacity Opacity
      
UI -0.073* -0.020 
(0.043) (0.016) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.043* 0.129*** 
(0.025) (0.027) 
Sales Volatility 0.070*** 0.086*** 
(0.013) (0.021) 
Log Sales -0.009* -0.007 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.112*** -0.122*** 
(0.036) (0.020) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets -0.002 -0.016 
(0.038) (0.033) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Z-score 0.001 0.004** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Unemployment Rate -0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) 
GDP Growth 0.001 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 35,518 27,668 
R-squared 0.365 0.518 
 
This table presents regression results on changes in UI. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the sum of 
absolute discretionary accruals from years t-1 to t+1. UI is the log of maximum total benefits. We split the sample 
based on whether UI increased from the prior year. Control variables are defined in Table 2. We report coefficient 
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 9: Impact of Unemployment Insurance with Alternative Measures of Opacity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AQ AQ Modified_Opacity Modified_Opacity 
          
UI -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.014** -0.018** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.018** 0.018* 0.030** 0.031* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) 
Sales Volatility 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) 
Log Sales -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market to Book 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on Assets -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.007 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.019) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets 0.016** 0.013 0.020 0.025* 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001* -0.001*** -0.001* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Z-score -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP Growth 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 43,608 36,735 63,186 53,614 
R-squared 0.501 0.500 0.762 0.760 
 
This table presents regression results on alternative measures of opacity. AQ is from the Dechow-Dichev (2002) 
model and is the standard deviation of residuals from firm-specific regressions of working capital on past, present, 
and future cash flows from years t-1 to t+1. Modified_Opacityt is the mean of absolute abnormal accruals from t to 
t+n-1, where t+n is the first year of increase in unemployment benefits. UI is the log of maximum total benefits. 
Control variables are defined in Table 2. Industries with a dispersed workforce are excluded in column (2) and (4). 
We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by 
state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 10: Impact of Unemployment Insurance on Firm Value 
   
  (1) (2) 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
      
Opacity × High UI -0.669*** -0.634** 
(0.254) (0.249) 
Opacity 0.942*** 0.981*** 
(0.178) (0.180) 
High UI 0.111 0.103 
(0.086) (0.087) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.954*** 0.912*** 
(0.269) (0.271) 
Sales Volatility 0.267*** 0.288*** 
(0.086) (0.082) 
Log Sales -0.203*** -0.166*** 
(0.047) (0.046) 
Return on Assets 0.986*** 0.875*** 
(0.209) (0.211) 
Proportion of Fixed Assets -0.645** -0.639** 
(0.284) (0.279) 
Leverage -0.168*** -0.105*** 
(0.021) (0.017) 
Z-score -0.047** -0.057*** 
(0.019) (0.020) 
Unemployment Rate -0.011 -0.008 
(0.021) (0.021) 
GDP Growth 0.029*** 0.029*** 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 60,555 60,555 
R-squared 0.498 0.485 
This table presents regression results on firm value. In column (1), Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. Market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of 
common stock less the sum of the book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. In column (2), 
Tobin’s Q is defined as book value of liabilities plus the market value of common stock less the sum of the book 
value of common stock, balance sheet deferred taxes, preferred stocks, and investment tax credit, divided by the 
book value of assets. Opacity is from Hutton et al. (2009) and is the sum of absolute discretionary accruals from 
years t-1 to t+1. High UI is an indicator variable for firm-years with above median UI, where UI is the log of 
maximum total benefits. Control variables are defined in Table 2. We report coefficient estimates and standard 
errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by state. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
